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Abstract
With fast-track authority (FTA), the US Congress delegates trade-policy authority
to the President by committing not to amend a trade agreement. Why would it cede
such power? We suggest an interpretation in which Congress uses FTA to forestall
destructive competition between its members for protectionist rents. In our model: (i)
FTA is never granted if an industry operates in the majority of districts; (ii) The more
symmetric the industrial pattern, the more likely is FTA, since competition for pro-
tectionist rents is most punishing when bargaining power is symmetrically distributed;
(iii) Widely disparate initial tari¤s prevent free trade even with FTA.
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1 Introduction
A peculiar, but crucial, institution of trade policy in the United States is a legislative de-
vice known as Fast Track Authority (FTA).1 This is a temporary authority that Congress
sometimes gives to the President at its discretion, and which empowers the President to
negotiate a trade agreement under conditions that allow for rapid ratication with a Con-
gressional commitment to vote up or down with importantly no amendments permitted.
In practice, it is a matter of consensus that FTA is a precondition for US participation in
trade negotiations with foreign governments, but it is a paradoxical institution because it is
a voluntary cessation of some of Congressown power to the President.
In this paper we attempt to explain Congressmotivation in adopting FTA. We use some
insights from the political economy of public nance to show that Congressional amendments
of a trade agreement can result in a sort of ruinous competition as each member of Congress
seeks advantage for his constituents, making constituents in all districts worse o¤ in the
process. One motivation for a measure like FTA can be to avoid this problem by e¤ectively
delegating trade policy to the executive branch.
This argument is similar to observations made by some close observers of US trade policy
history, such as Koh (1992, p. 148), who suggests that one of the principal reasons Congress
wanted FTA is that it controlled domestic special interest group pressures that might oth-
erwise have provoked extensive, ad hoc amendment of a negotiated trade accord.Destler
(1991) argues that the disaster of the Smoot-Hawley tari¤ of 1930 had motivated Congress
to delegate trade policy largely to the executive branch, avoiding the sometimes chaotic
process of Congressional amendments (p. 263) and allowing for more liberal outcomes than
Congress itself would have adopted on its own (pp. 264-5). He emphasizes that this dele-
gation of authority (through FTA and other measures) was a positive-sum game(p. 265)
that was politically useful both for Congress and for the executive branch, as well as good
for the country as a whole. These observations are consistent with a story in which Congress
1In recent years, the o¢ cial name has changed to Trade Promotion Authority,but in this paper we will
use the more traditional term.
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uses FTA to delegate signicant authority over trade policy to the executive branch because
it does not trust itself, through the non-cooperative process of Congressional bargaining, to
achieve a desirable outcome, and in particular expects the executive branch to achieve more
trade-friendly, liberal outcomes than Congress would itself. This is the essence of the story
we o¤er in this paper.
Background. The earliest Congressional delegation of trade-policy authority was the 1934
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which provided for temporary authority for the President
to negotiate a trade agreement that, provided it satised strict criteria, would be approved
in advance. This authority was used several times until modern fast-track authority was rst
created in 1974 as part of the Trade Reform Act. This form of delegation retained more
discretion for Congress, because although it imposed a strict time limit for Congressional
decision making on any trade agreement and prohibited amendments to the agreement, it
did allow Congress to reject an agreement ex post. Ever since, FTA has been an integral part
of US trade policy, playing a key role in ratication of the Tokyo and Uruguay rounds, the
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. (See
Koh (1992), Destler (1991), and Smith (2006) for concise histories.)
Some Earlier Approaches. There have been other notable attempts to interpret FTA.
Conconi, Facchini and M. Zanardi (2012) suggest an interpretation of FTA as a way of
enhancing US bargaining power relative to the foreign government that is party to a trade
negotiation. The model relies on the insight that it is sometimes advantageous to delegate
bargaining to an agent whose preferences are di¤erent from ones own, in particular an agent
who is less eager to arrive at an agreement, in order to extract more concessions from the
other bargaining partner. Essentially, without the FTA, Congress is in e¤ect bargaining with
the foreign government. A member of Congress from a district that depends on an export
industry will be very eager for an agreement, and may wish to delegate bargaining to the
President, who is interested in maximizing welfare of the average district and is therefore less
eager for an agreement and therefore more likely to be able to receive major concessions from
the foreign government. This strategic bargaining-power argument is complementary to ours.
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In order to make the distinction clear, we will articially shut down the bargaining-power
channel by adopting the ction that the US is a small-open economy.
Another approach to explaining FTA is o¤ered by Lohmann and OHalloran (1994). In
their model, the Congressional process without FTA leads to log-rolling,as each member
of Congress in turn proposes a tari¤ to protect the dominant industry in his own district,
and each member of Congress votes in favor of all other membersproposed tari¤s in order
to ensure that his own tari¤ will in turn be approved. As a result, the outcome is ine¢ cient,
high protection. Depending on parameters, a majority in Congress may prefer to hand
responsibility for trade policy setting over to the executive branch, which will set tari¤s to
maximize weighted utility across districts (the weights depend on partisanship). This story
is similar to ours in that it does not depend on an external bargaining e¤ect, but rather
on ine¢ ciencies in Congressional tari¤-setting that members of Congress themselves seek to
avoid by delegation. However, we are interested in economic determinants of FTA, such as
of the geographic distribution and size distribution of industries. Lohmann and OHalloran
shut down this topic by assuming economically symmetric districts, in order to focus on the
political variables (such as partisanship) that are their main interest.
Our Approach. In our model of a (unicameral) Congress, each Congressional district is
represented by a legislator who is concerned with his districts welfare only, whereas the
President cares about the whole countrys welfare.2 Each industry is concentrated in one or
more districts, so welfare of any district is closely related to the industry operating in that
district.
Trade policy formation takes place as a two-stage process: First, Congress decides by ma-
jority vote whether or not to grant FTA to the President, and then trade policy is determined
either by the President (if FTA is granted in the rst stage) or by Congress (if FTA is denied
in the rst stage). When FTA is granted, Congress either approves or disapproves the chosen
policy by the President without amending it. If Congress approves the Presidents policy,
2Assuming that the President cares about the whole countrys welfare without bias is a useful simpli-
cation motivated by the fact that in the United States, legislators come from plurality elections in small
districts whereas the President is elected in national elections. In the conclusion we will comment briey on
consequences of relaxing this assumption.
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it goes into e¤ect, otherwise no policy change occurs and the status quo prevails. When
FTA is not granted, trade policy is determined by Congressional bargaining as in Baron and
Ferejohn (1989).3 A legislator is selected randomly to propose a trade bill.4 If the proposal
receives a majority, the bill goes to the President and the President either approves or vetoes
it. If the bill is approved, it is implemented and the legislature adjourns. If the bill is vetoed
and Congress does not override the veto, then a new legislator (possibly the same as in the
previous period) is selected to propose a new trade bill. On the other hand, if the proposal
does not receive a majority, there is no change in welfare level of any district (the status quo
prevails) and the process is repeated with a new legislator to propose a new trade bill. In
their voting, legislators compare the current proposal with the alternative of continuing to
the next period.
This approach allows us to study the e¤ect of a countrys internal political conict on its
trade policy determination, and formalize how the domestic special interest group pressures
can [provoke] extensive, ad hoc amendment of a negotiated trade accord(Koh (1992, p.
148)) which Congress might wish to avoid by delegating discretion to the executive branch.
This exercise reveals a number of sharp predictions. First, FTA is always granted when
the industries are su¢ ciently symmetric in their geographic distribution, output levels, and
status quo tari¤s. Second, FTA is never granted if an industry is operating in the majority
of districts. Third, su¢ cient asymmetries in the geographic distribution or output levels
of industries ensure that FTA will fail.5 Forth, su¢ cient asymmetries in initial rates of
protection across industries can prevent the economy from reaching free trade even if FTA
3The adaptation of the Baron and Ferejohn model to this context is not trivial. One reason is that
distortionary tari¤s mean that the size of the pie is a¤ected by the outcome, and not merely the distribution
of the pie. Another reason is that status quo tari¤s have a signicant role in the equilibrium in some cases, as
we will see in Case 3 with di¤erent initial tari¤s for di¤erent industries. There is no analogous complication
in the original Baron and Ferejohn model.
4While random recognition does not mimic any actual procedures of a legislature, it is a useful device
for capturing the inherent uncertainty that legislators face in building distributive coalitions. Random
recognition is a way of modelling the fact that legislators do not know exactly which coalitions will form in
the future if the current coalition fails to enact the legislation. See Celik, Karabay and McLaren (2013) for
an extensive discussion of this point with historical examples.
5The importance of geographical distribution in trade policy formation is also emphasized in McLaren
and Karabay (2004).
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is granted.
Interpretation. The idea that members of Congress may feel empowered by a measure
that removes their own future freedom of action may be illustrated by a simple parable.
Consider a group of travelers who loathe and distrust each other and who are shipwrecked
on a remote island, each carrying some necessary supplies rescued from the sinking ship. If
they discover a loaded pistol left behind by some earlier explorer, they all su¤er; knowing
that whoever wakes up rst will be able to gain control of the rearm and obtain all of the
supplies for himself, no-one will be able to enjoy a proper nights sleep. As a result, the
castaways decide, by majority vote, to destroy the weapon by dropping it in the volcano
before sundown. (Yes, the island has a volcano.)
As a helpful guide, in this analogy, the castaways are members of Congress; the gun is
the ability to amend a trade agreement; and the volcano is Fast Track Authority.
However, this story depends on the castawayssituation being symmetric, with similar
abilities and endowments. The story may end di¤erently if a bare majority of the castaways
happen to be unemployed ninjas, who are skilled at disarming an assailant. These would
expect to be able to win any conict involving the rearm, and so they would not wish to
drop it into the volcano. This corresponds to a case in which a single industry dominates
a majority of Congressional districts, which will be studied as Case 1 below, so that that
industry will be able to out-compete other industries in the Congressional bargaining game.
Somewhat more subtly, it also corresponds to a case in which a majority of districts are
dominated by industries with lower output and higher import-penetration rates than the
other industries, studied below as Case 2, because as will be seen, such industries also are
better at playing the Congressional tari¤-bargaining game and so have an advantage. Enough
asymmetry of the sort described by Cases 1 and 2 will result in a failure of FTA to pass.
Related work. Of course, the idea of delegation has appeared in a number of forms
in the economics literature. Rogo¤ (1985) and Melumad and Mookherjee (1989) study
delegation as a way of solving a time-consistency problem (in monetary policy and tax
auditing, respectively). In addition, Besley and Coate (2003) analyze centralization (through
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delegation) versus decentralization for provision of public goods. Decentralization creates
under-provision of public goods due to the presence of positive spillovers. Centralization,
on the other hand, can create misallocation of resources and uncertainty (if decisions are
made by minimum winning coalition) or overprovision of resources (if decisions are made
under joint welfare maximization of all legislators). As a result, one needs to evaluate the
benets and costs of each in determining the optimal decision-making structure for public
good provision. Fershtman and Judd (1987) show that delegation of management can raise
prots for a rm in an oligopoly. Our paper is di¤erent from all of these papers since in
none of them is delegation motivated by concern for bargaining over rent dissipation as in
our paper.
More closely related to our theory, the idea of Congress preventing its own ruinous
competition through non-cooperative bargaining over policy has an important antecedent
in the theory of self-imposed Congressional budget caps, as explored by Primo (2006). He
focuses on spending limits and executive veto on spending and shows that while imposing a
cap on spending is welfare improving, the e¤ect of a veto on spending depends on the presence
of a cap as well as the ideology of the executive. The core of the argument comes from the
dynamic theory of Congressional bargaining pioneered by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and
Baron (1993), and applied to trade policy in Celik, Karabay and McLaren (2013) and Bowen
(2013). Celik, Karabay and McLaren (2013) construct a dynamic model of trade policy-
making in which tari¤s are determined via non-cooperative congressional bargaining. Their
setting generates some features that are quite di¤erent than existing models (for example, ex
ante identical industries end up with di¤erent levels of protection), and thus pose a challenge
for empirical work. On the other hand, Bowen (2013) compares the e¤ects of two important
elements of WTO agreements on tari¤ determination by the legislature: tari¤ bindings and
administered protection. In her model, tari¤ bindings act as a ceiling on the choice of
applied most-favored-nation (MFN) tari¤s, whereas administered protection creates a oor.
She shows that administered protection expands the set of initial conditions that lead to low
applied MFN tari¤s, whereas tari¤ bindings decrease them and thus makes it less likely to
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reach low applied MFN tari¤ outcome.
More generally, the idea of Congressional delegation to avoid competition for rents might
be applied to a number of policy areas beyond trade policy. Congress delegates detailed
policy-making to specied agencies quite often. In 1990, it created the Base Realignment
and Closure Commission (BRAC) to delegate the choice of which military bases to close.
This issue would otherwise be embroiled in conict over which Congressional district would
lose local jobs, and so raises bargaining issues quite close to those raised by tari¤ setting.
The BRAC commission periodically submits its national plan to Congress for an up-or-down
vote, which is quite similar to the way FTA works. Similarly, in 2010, Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which created a Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The CFPB has the power to establish regulations
to protect consumers from unscrupulous lenders. Another example is the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), which has broad power to declare an e­ uent as harmful to the
environment and to write rules restricting it. These are cases in which Congress has delegated
rule-writing to an outside body; whether in those latter two cases it have chosen to do so
because of bargaining ine¢ ciencies we study or for some other reason (complexity, expertise,
and so forth) could be an interesting question for another day.
The following section lays out our model. Section 3 derives the conditions under which
FTA will be approved, for the fully symmetric case and then for asymmetric Cases 1 through
3. The last section discusses the results and concludes.
2 Model
We consider a small open economy populated with a unit measure of individuals living in
N districts (where N > 3 and divisible by 3).6 There are M = 4 industries: one that
supplies a homogeneous numeraire good (good 0) produced with labor alone, and three
6We should emphasize, however, that the small-country assumption does not drive our results. In our
model the optimal tari¤ is zero, and so the President desires free trade. By contrast, in the case of a large
open economy, the optimal tari¤ vector would be non-zero, and so the President would desire to move policy
toward the non-zero optimal tari¤s, but all of the dynamics of bargaining and the incentives of legislators to
delegate policy making authority would be the same.
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others, each of which supplies a homogeneous manufacturing good (goods 1 through 3)
produced with sector-specic capital alone. In particular, we assume that the production
technology for good 0 yields 1 unit of output per unit of labor input, and the technology
for each manufacturing good takes the following form: f(Ki) = Ki, where Ki and  denote
the amount of the sector-specic capital used in sector i and the economy-wide productivity
parameter, respectively. (Unless specied otherwise, we use index letters (i; j; k) only for
the manufacturing goods.)
Each district hosts one manufacturing industry along with the numeraire good indus-
try.7 ;8 In addition, each district is composed of a homogeneous population; each individual
residing in a given district is endowed with one unit of labor and also one unit of the same
type of sector-specic capital. Let the number of districts producing good i be denoted by
ni such that n1 + n2 + n3 = N . Districts that produce the same manufacturing good are
populated by the same number of individuals. To save on notation, we let Ki denote both
the total amount of type-i capital in a type-i district and the total number of individuals
residing in a type-i district. Given that the population is of unit mass,
3P
i=1
niKi = 1.9 Let
qi denote the amount of good i produced in a district that hosts industry i, and Qi denote
the total amount of good i produced in the economy. Therefore, we have qi = Ki and
Qi = niqi.10 This implies that
3P
i=1
Qi = 
3P
i=1
niKi = . In addition, let pi and pi represent,
respectively, the exogenous world price of good i and its domestic price. On the other hand,
the numeraire good, good 0, has a world and domestic price equal to 1 (see footnote 14).
Thus, the total rent that accrues to capital in district i is piqi = piKi, and the total labor
7Our results carry over even if more than one industry is allowed in each district as long as each resident
still holds only one sector-specic capital and in every district there is one industry with majority repre-
sentation. This is true since each legislator will follow the interests of the median voter, who belongs to a
particular industry under the conditions assumed here.
8We do not model the location choice of a particular industry, rather we take it as given. However, we
acknowledge that this choice may depend on the political inuence an industry can exert in each location.
9We allow only those districts that produce di¤erent goods to di¤er in the number of citizens residing.
This is done to simplify the notation. Alternatively, it is possible to allow each district (even the ones
producing the same good) to be populated by di¤erent number of individuals. All of our results continue to
hold.
10To make things simple and analytically tractable, aggregate output of each industry is perfectly inelastic
in our setup. This is merely to eliminate some complexity, but there is some evidence that supply elasticities
tend to be quite low in practice; see Marquez (1990) and Gagnon (2003).
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income earned in district i is Ki.
Each individual has an identical, additively separable quasi-linear utility function given
by
u = c0 +
3X
i=1
ui (ci) ,
where c0 is the consumption of good 0 and ci represents the consumption of good i = 1; 2; 3.
We assume that ui (ci) = Rici  (c2i =2), where Ri > 0 and assumed to be su¢ ciently large.11
With these preferences, the domestic demand for good i, implicitly dened by u0i (d(pi)) = pi,
is given by d(pi) = Ri  pi. The linearity of demand is not crucial for the main results of our
paper, but it simplies the analysis and permits a closed-form solution. The indirect utility
of an individual with income y is y + s (p), where p = (p1; p2; p3) is the vector of domestic
prices,12 and s (p) =
P3
i=1 [ui (d(pi))  pid(pi)] is the resulting consumer surplus.
Each district is represented by a single legislator who is concerned only with the welfare
of his own district. A districts welfare is the aggregate utility of all individuals in that
district, which is equal to the total income plus the districts share in total consumer surplus
and total tari¤ revenue (or subsidy cost) for each good. Hence, a district that produces good
i has a welfare (for i 6= j 6= k)
Wi(p) = Ki + piKi +Ki
X
l=i;j;k
(Rl   pl)2
2
+Ki
X
l=i;j;k
[(pl   pl ) (Rl   pl  Ql)] , (1)
where the rst term is the districts labor income (equal to one unit of good 0 output per
person), the second term is the capital rent, the third term is the consumer surplus captured
by that district, and the last term is the share of tari¤ revenue (or subsidy cost).13 Similarly,
we denote wi(p) as the welfare of an individual with a stake in industry i, hence
wi(p) = 1 + pi +
X
l=i;j;k
(Rl   pl)2
2
+
X
l=i;j;k
[(pl   pl ) (Rl   pl  Ql)] . (2)
11To be more precise, we require Ri > pi +   Qi. This ensures that demand for good i is positive at all
prices that may occur in equilibrium. We also require pi > Qi for each price to be positive. See Lemmas 1
and 2 for the determination of optimal tari¤s (hence optimal prices).
12We restrict each domestic price to satisfy: 0  pi < pi, where pi = pi + (Ri p

i )
2+( Qi)2
2( Qi) . These limits
ensure that we get an interior solution in prices.
13We assume that tari¤ revenue (or subsidy cost) is distributed equally as a lump-sum transfer to each
individual.
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Moreover, there is also the President, and unlike the legislators, she has a national con-
stituency and cares about the welfare of the whole country. As a result, her welfare is
expressed as
W (p) =
3X
i=1
niKiwi(p). (3)
We consider an innite-horizon model. Every period, there is a set of prices at which in-
dividuals make their production and consumption decisions, and enjoy the resulting welfare.
We restrict the set of policy instruments available to politicians and allow only for trade
taxes and subsidies. A domestic price in excess of the world price implies an import tari¤
for an import good and an export subsidy for an export good. Domestic prices below world
prices correspond to import subsidies and export taxes.14 The status quo domestic prices at
the beginning of the game are denoted by ps = (ps1; p
s
2; p
s
3).
The timing of the trade policy formation game is given in Figure 1.15 First, Congress
decides whether to grant FTA to the President. FTA will be granted if the majority of
legislators vote for it. If it is granted, then the President proposes a tari¤ bill and legislators
vote yes or no without amending it.16 If accepted by Congress, the bill is implemented
and legislative process ends. Each districts welfare thereafter is evaluated at these new
prices. If Congress rejects the Presidents proposal, then all districts receive their status quo
payo¤s forever. If FTA is not granted, on the other hand, Congress enters what we will
call the bargaining subgame where trade policy is determined by Congressional bargaining
as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989). A legislator is selected randomly (with equal probability
14Without loss of generality, we assume that the tari¤/subsidy on good 0 is equal to 0. Any tari¤ vector
 0 yielding domestic prices p0 = p +  0 with  00 6= 0 can be replaced by  00  1p00 [
0    00p] yielding
p00 = p +  00 without changing relative prices or any real values. Given that good 0 is the numeraire, this
implies that p000 = p

0 = 1.
15To simplify, we assume that a period in the trade policy formation game coincides with a produc-
tion/consumption period.
16Of course, in reality FTA is granted to allow the President to negotiate a trade agreement with for-
eign governments. As mentioned in the introduction, in order to close down the issues of strategic inter-
governmental bargaining that are the focus of Conconi et al. (2012), and to allow us to focus on the
intra-congressional competition that is our interest, we employ the ction that FTA is granted in order to
give the President authority simply to choose a tari¤ policy. In practice, the calculus of whether or not to
authorize FTA would take both sets of issues into account.
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for each legislator) to propose a tari¤ bill.17 If the proposal does not receive a majority,
the process is repeated with another randomly selected legislator (possibly the same as in
the previous period) to make a new proposal. If the proposal receives a simple majority,
it is brought before the President for approval. If the President accepts the proposal, then
it is implemented and each districts welfare thereafter is evaluated at these new prices. If
the President vetoes it, then the same legislator may bring the same proposal to a vote in
Congress. If 2=3 of the legislators support the proposal (hence overriding the veto), then it is
implemented and the legislature adjourns. Otherwise, another randomly selected legislator
is selected to make a new proposal. Bargaining continues until a program is implemented.
Districts continue to receive their status quo welfare in every period until an agreement is
reached. (A fuller analysis of the bargaining game without the President can be found in
Celik, Karabay and McLaren (2013).)
[Insert Figure 1 here]
There are a couple of observations to make. First, it is straightforward to show that
the aggregate welfare, W (p) =
P3
i=1 niKiwi(p), is maximized at the free trade prices of
the three goods. Hence, the President would always propose free trade if she thinks that
Congress will agree to it.
Second, from equation (1), a manufacturing good a¤ects (through its price) a districts
welfare via three channels. The rst channel, the rent that accrues to the specic factor, is
present if that good is produced in that district. The second channel is the consumer surplus
attained from the consumption of that good. The last channel is the tari¤revenue (or subsidy
cost) due to trade. The e¤ect of price through the rst channel is always positive whereas
it is always negative through the second channel. Its e¤ect through the third channel, on
the other hand, can be positive or negative (in fact the third channel is strictly concave in
all three prices with a unique maximum). This is true since good is price has two distinct
e¤ects on tari¤ revenue/subsidy cost: (1) the direct e¤ect (changing price while keeping
17Therefore, the probability that the proposer represents industry i is equal to niN .
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imports/exports constant), and (2) the indirect e¤ect through demand. These two e¤ects
work in opposite directions. To see this, assume that good i is an imported good. First,
start from a price just above the world price. As we increase the price, the direct e¤ect
leads to an increase in the tari¤ revenue whereas the indirect e¤ect leads to a decrease (since
import demand goes down). Initially, the direct e¤ect dominates, and therefore, raising the
price raises tari¤ revenue. When the price reaches a certain value, the indirect e¤ect starts
dominating and the tari¤ revenue decreases if we further increase the price.
For the remainder of the analysis, let  = ( 1;  2;  3) denote the tari¤ vector, where
 i = pi   pi . Therefore, we can rewrite equation (2) as
wi( ) = 1 + (p

i +  i) +
X
l=i;j;k
(Rl   pl    l)2
2
+
X
l=i;j;k
 l (Rl   pl    l  Ql) . (4)
Notice that, given our parameter restrictions (see footnotes 11 and 12), the per-capita welfare
function given in equation (4) is strictly concave in all tari¤s and has a unique maximum.
Similarly, let  s = ( s1; 
s
2; 
s
3) describe the vector of status quo tari¤s. It will prove
helpful to write down the change in the per-capita welfare over status quo when Congress
agrees on a tari¤ bill  . To do so, simply evaluate equation (4) at  =  s and subtract it
from wi( ), which leads to
wi( )  wi( s) = (pi +  i   pi    si ) +
X
l=i;j;k
(Rl   pl    l)2   (Rl   pl    sl )2
2
+
X
l=i;j;k
[ l (Rl   pl    l  Ql)   sl (Rl   pl    sl  Ql)] .
After rearranging, this becomes
wi( )  wi( s) = ( i    si ) 
1
2
X
l=i;j;k

( l +Ql)
2   ( sl +Ql)2

. (5)
The rst term on the right-hand side of equation (5) is the per-capita change in capital rent
while the second term indicates the per-capita change in consumer surplus plus tari¤ revenue.
This representation is helpful as it allows us to express the per-capita welfare change in each
district as a function of each industrys tari¤ and total output.
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We can alternatively express the per-capita welfare as an increment over free trade. To do
so, repeat the same steps as above (or, alternatively, evaluate equation (5) at  s = (0; 0; 0))
to obtain
wi( ) = wi(0) +
"
 i   1
2
X
l=i;j;k
 
( l +Ql)
2  Q2l
#
. (6)
The rst-best for each legislator is to maximize his districts welfare without any con-
straints. Note that since each individual in a given district is identical, maximizing aggregate
district welfare Wi( ) is equivalent to maximizing per-capita welfare wi( ). For a legislator
representing industry i, let Ui = (Uii ; 
Ui
j ; 
Ui
k ), i 6= j 6= k, denote the vector of trade taxes
that the unconstrained maximization problem leads to, i.e., Ui = argmax

wi( ). Maximiz-
ing equation (6) with respect to  leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Unconstrained maximization of wi( ), i = 1; 2; 3, yields (for i 6= j 6= k)
Uii =   Qi,
Uij =  Qj,
Uik =  Qk.
Thus, a recognized (selected) legislator would ideally demand an import tari¤ (or an
export subsidy) for the good his district produces (thereby protecting the industry he rep-
resents) whereas an import subsidy (or an export tax) for the other goods.18 Moreover, a
producer in a sector that produces a higher aggregate output Qi will prefer a lower tari¤
(or export subsidy) for his own product than a producer in a sector that produces lower
aggregate output. The reason is as follows. Focus for now on the case of an imported good.
Recall the three channels we discussed before through which the tari¤ a¤ects the per-capita
welfare of producers in industry i. Aggregate output, Qi, in this case does not a¤ect the
rst two channels (the rent and consumer surplus channels of course, a higher Qi implies
higher total rent, but not higher rent per capital owner in industry i). What it does a¤ect
is the third channel, tari¤ revenue. A higher value for Qi implies a weaker tari¤ revenue
18Since Q1 +Q2 +Q3 = ,   Qi > 0, 8i.
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e¤ect since, at a given price and the other parameters, a higher value of Qi implies fewer
imports, hence a lower marginal tari¤ revenue for a given increase in tari¤.19 Therefore, a
higher value of Qi implies a lower marginal benet of the tari¤, and a lower optimal tari¤,
from the point of view of a sector-i producer. Parallel reasoning holds for an exported good.
It is natural to assume that the status quo prices are in the range dened by the un-
constrained maximization problem. For example, a legislator representing a district that
produces good i has no reason to set  i above  Qi. Similarly, he has no reason to set  j 6=i
below  Qj. Hence, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The status quo prices satisfy the following:  Qi   si = psi   pi    Qi,
for i = 1; 2; 3.
A value of  si =    Qi corresponds to the case in which the status quo tari¤ of good i
is at its optimum for the districts that produce good i, while  si =  Qi corresponds to the
case in which it is at its optimum for the districts that produce good j 6= i. Accordingly,
the status quo corresponds to the optimal tari¤ vector for the districts that produce good i
when ( si ; 
s
j ; 
s
k) = (  Qi; Qj; Qk).
Below, we will rst describe the model in greater detail. After that, as a benchmark, we
will analyze a fully symmetric case in which each industry has the same output, same status
quo tari¤ and the same representation in Congress. We will then relax each of them one at
a time.
3 Characterization of equilibrium
Let us look at the problem more in detail. First, if ni  2=3 for any i, the problem becomes
trivial; legislators representing industry i will have enough seats to overturn a possible veto
19The same conclusion holds for a comparison between two industries i and j even if, although Qi > Qj ,
the demand parameter Ri is su¢ ciently higher than Rj that at a common tari¤, imports of good i exceed
those of good j. The reason is that an increase in Ri, holding all prices and other parameters constant,
raises industry i imports, increasing the marginal tari¤ revenue from the tari¤ on good i, but at the same
time raises domestic consumption of good i, raising the marginal consumer surplus loss from the tari¤ on
good i. The two e¤ects cancel each other out, with the result that the demand parameters Ri have no e¤ect
on tari¤ preferences.
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by the President. Hence, the legislators that represent industry i refuse FTA and, with the
discount factor approaching 1, will subsequently be able to achieve their rst-best payo¤
in the legislative bargaining subgame. For the remainder of the analysis, we assume that
ni < 2=3, 8i. Second, as a tie-breaking rule, in case of indi¤erence between payo¤s under
FTA and under no FTA, we will assume that FTA is preferred.
If Congress grants FTA in the rst stage, the President chooses  so as to maximize total
welfare while making sure that Congress does not reject it. If Congress does not grant FTA,
then Congress plays a bargaining game to determine the tari¤ vector, with a randomly-
selected member serving as a proposer each period until an agreement is reached. Each
legislator is interested in maximizing his own districts welfare, but even a legislator who has
been selected as the proposer may not be able to achieve the rst-best payo¤ for his district.
The reason is that in order to build a veto-proof coalition, he may need to compromise a
certain fraction of his payo¤ and choose a favorable price for at least one of the other two
industries. We refer to this situation as the proposer selecting a coalition partner(or simply
forming a coalition).
As common in multi-person bargaining problems, there may be many subgame perfect
equilibria (SPE) in this game.20 We focus on stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE)
whereby the continuation payo¤s for each structurally equivalent subgame are the same.21 In
20Baron and Ferejohn (1989) show that any outcome (in their game that means any division of the dollar)
can be supported as an SPE using innitely nested punishment strategies as long as there are at least ve
players and the discount factor is su¢ ciently high. Li (2009) shows that even with three players, there is a
vast multiplicity of SPE.
21This is of course restrictive, and omits optimal equilibria in which members punish each other in future
for socially sub-optimal behavior now, but we follow the literature in focussing on SSPEs for a number of
reasons. First, Baron and Kalai (1993) argue that stationarity is an attractive restriction since it is the
simplest equilibrium and so it requires the fewest computations by agents. Indeed, in a model such as
this, an optimal equilibrium would require any member to refuse a tari¤ vector o¤ered to it that deviates
from the social optimum even though that member prefers it both to the status quo and to free trade,
because he anticipates an even more favorable deviation from free trade to be o¤ered to him next period as
a reward by whoever the proposer turns out to be. Such behavior seems at odds with the way politicians
function in practice. Further, an optimal equilibrium with a high discount factor would be close to free trade,
while legislative history has never looked that way even though turnover rates in Congress are low and so
implied discount rates would be high (see the examples in Celik, Karabay and McLaren (2013), Section 1.1,
for example). Thus, the optimalequilibrium is not a very realistic way of modeling legislative behavior.
Extension to such equilibria would still be of interest, and would presumably limit the circumstances in which
FTA would be chosen. These issues are discussed in more depth in Celik, Karabay and McLaren (2013, pp.
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a stationary equilibrium, a legislator who is recognized to make a proposal in any two di¤erent
sessions behaves the same way in both sessions (in the case of a mixed-strategy equilibrium,
this means choosing the same probability distribution over o¤ers in both sessions). Hence,
stationary equilibria are history-independent. To make our results as clear as possible, we
focus on the case in which the discount factor (denoted by ) approaches 1 in the limit.22
When a legislator is recognized to make a proposal in the bargaining subgame, he has
an incentive to propose a tari¤ bill that will be accepted, since if rejected, he faces the risk
that his district might be worse o¤ by the bill adopted in the future. In equilibrium, in
accordance with the Rikers (1962) size principle,any proposal will be accepted with the
minimal number of industries to form a veto-proof coalition. This is true since increasing
the number of industries in the coalition would increase the costs without increasing the
benets.
Let the per-period equilibrium welfare of a district producing good i, evaluated at the
beginning of a period, before a proposer has been selected, be denoted as Vi. This is also the
per-period equilibrium welfare a district expects in the following period in the event that the
period ends without a bill passed, and so we will also call it the continuation payo¤.(Recall
that we are focussed on the limiting case as  ! 1.) We can also express the continuation
payo¤ of a district producing good i on a per capita basis: vi = ViKi .
3.1 Fully Symmetric Benchmark
In this benchmark, we assume n1
N
= n2
N
= n3
N
= 1
3
, Q1 = Q2 = Q3 = 3 and 
s
1 = 
s
2 = 
s
3.
The following observations are in order. First, any two-industry coalition can overturn the
Presidents veto, so the Presidents veto power is ine¤ective. Second, under FTA, it is
187-188).
22This may be interpreted such that the time length between any two o¤ers (periods) is innitesimally
short. This assumption on  is made for analytical convenience, as equilibrium is much harder to solve for
general . In Celik, Karabay and McLaren (2013, Section 3), we do argue that  close to 1 is the most
empirically relevant case. In addition, in Appendix B of that paper, we show how the equilibrium for the
case with  close to 1 extends to a positive range of  in the case in which the status quo tari¤s are the
outcome of a previous round of bargaining. Later, in the current paper we will note that Proposition 1
applies for all values of . Therefore, we are condent that our focus on the limiting case of  close to 1 is
not deceptive.
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easy to see that the President will choose free trade. Recall that the aggregate welfare is
maximized at free trade prices. Therefore, when industries have symmetric status quo tari¤s
(as assumed here), their status quo welfare is bounded above by what they enjoy in free
trade. This, in turn, implies that there will be no objection by the members of Congress
when the President chooses free trade under FTA. Third, as we show below, the legislative
bargaining makes each industry worse o¤compared to free trade, and therefore each industry
will choose to delegate the decision-making authority to the President in the rst stage. All
these observations imply that under this benchmark, FTA is granted to the President in the
rst stage and she chooses free trade in equilibrium.
In order to analyze FTA decision, we need to use backward induction. We rst nd the
ex ante expected welfare of each industry in the legislative bargaining subgame (when FTA
is not granted), then compare it with the one under FTA and show that the latter is greater
than the former for all industries so that FTA is granted in the rst stage.
To do so, assume that Congress has not granted FTA and a legislator representing a
district which produces good i is recognized to propose a tari¤ vector,  i. To obtain the
majority support in Congress, the proposal must make one of remaining two industries happy.
Suppose industry j 6= i is chosen as a partner. We assume that a legislator votes yes to a
proposal if and only if the benets accruing to his district from the current proposal is at
least as high as the expected payo¤ it obtains in case the proposal does not pass.23 Thus,
legislators who represent districts that produce good j 6= i would say yes if and only if24
wj(
i)
1    wj(
s) +
vj
1   .
The left-hand side of the above inequality indicates the discounted per-capita welfare a
district that produces good j obtains at the proposed tari¤s, whereas the right-hand side is
the discounted expected per-capita payo¤ if bargaining is carried over to the following period
23In other words, we rule out weakly dominated strategies. In the absence of this assumption, a legislator
may choose to say yes to an otherwise unacceptable proposal if he believes that the proposal will receive a
majority support even without his vote. This implies there would be an equilibrium in which all legislators
vote yes to every proposal.
24Note that districts that accommodate the same industry are identical, so if this inequality holds for one,
then it also holds for all.
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(the status quo welfare for the current period and the continuation welfare thereafter).
The values of vj are endogenous, as they are determined by the equilibrium tari¤ bill
and the equilibrium probability of being in a winning coalition. However, any recognized
legislator will take them as given when designing the tari¤ bill. Moreover, the recognized
legislator will choose  such that the constraint is satised with equality, which means
that wj( ) = (1   )wj( s) + vj in equilibrium. In the limit as  goes to 1, this reduces
to wj( ) = vj.25 Hence, the recognized industry-i representatives maximization problem
becomes
max

wi( ) s.t. wj( ) = vj. (7)
As dened before, vj is the welfare an individual with a stake in industry j expects at
the beginning of a period; hence, it is a weighted average of possible ex post payo¤s the in-
dividual may obtain depending on the identity of the proposer. Since the ex post per-capita
welfare function given in equation (4) is independent of status quo tari¤s, so are the result-
ing equilibrium tari¤s and payo¤s found as a solution to expression (7). Intuitively, when
legislators are very patient, they place no weight on one-period gains (or losses) regardless
of how large they can be.
As in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), in an SSPE with  close to 1, generically the proposer
randomizes between the two other industries in choosing a coalition partner. (In fact, in the
fully symmetric case, randomization occurs for any value of .) The proof is in the appendix,
but the crux of the idea can be summarized as follows. In an SSPE, by denition, if proposer
i ever chooses industry j with probability 1, then (due to stationarity) he always will choose
industry j with probability 1. But this means that industry j has enormous bargaining
power, and consequently at any given date, it will be less attractive for i to choose j than
the other industry a contradiction. Let s denote the probability that i will choose j, and
hold constant the behavior of the other players when they are proposers. A reduction in
s lowers js continuation payo¤, hence bargaining power, and raises ks bargaining power
25To be more precise, when wj( s) < vj (wj( s) > vj), the proposer o¤ers the coalition partner an ex
post payo¤ that is innitesimally below (above) vj . In either case, lim
!1
wj( ) = vj .
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(i 6= k 6= j). Therefore, a critical value of s exists at which i is indi¤erent between the
two potential coalition partners, and this is the equilibrium value. The proper proof must
take into account boundary conditions as well as the fact that each players probability
over partners is endogenous, and it turns out that when all three playersprobabilities are
determined together, the equilibrium choice of probabilities is not unique, although the
payo¤s are.26 We present the outcome of the legislative bargaining subgame in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2. The fully symmetric legislative bargaining subgame has an SSPE in which a
selected legislator representing a district which produces good i proposes a tari¤  i = 3 for
the good his district produces, a tari¤  j = 0 for good j 6= i where j is selected randomly, and
a tari¤  k =   3 for the remaining good. The rst proposal receives a two-thirds majority
and Congress adjourns after the rst session. All SSPE are payo¤ equivalent.
Proof. See appendix.
Thus, the logic of congressional bargaining imposes di¤erent levels of protection for di¤er-
ent industries even if all industries are ex ante identical. In such a case, most other models
would predict  1 =  2 =  3, whereas in our model there would be three separate levels of
tari¤. We next present the main result of this section.
Proposition 1. When industries are ex ante identical, they all expect a lower per-capita
welfare in the legislative bargaining subgame than their corresponding free trade payo¤s, i.e.,
vi < wi (0) for all i. Hence, all legislators vote for FTA in the rst stage, the President
chooses free trade and Congress agrees to it.27
Proof. See appendix.
26For a formal proof of payo¤ uniqueness, see our companion paper Celik, Karabay and McLaren (2013).
The same multiplicity is also present in the standard symmetric Baron-Ferejohn game, see Celik and Karabay
(2013). Eraslan (2002) shows that all SSPE in the Baron-Ferejohn game are payo¤ equivalent when the
recognition probabilities are asymmetric.
27The same result obtains for any number of manufacturing industries. If there are M symmetric man-
ufacturing industries, the support of M 12 industries is required besides the industry the proposer belongs.
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The competition for rent sharing is the harshest when bargaining power is symmetrically
distributed. Under the legislative bargaining subgame, the representatives in Congress will
vote for a bill that they do not like, because with the dynamic bargaining, they are afraid
that if the current bill does not pass, it will be replaced with something that they like even
less. Each industry knows that total welfare will be lower compared to free trade as tari¤s
are introduced by the bargaining, but no-one knows who the ex post beneciary will be.
Consequently, given the symmetry among industries, all coalition partners will be happy
to accept a payo¤ that is worse than free trade rather than being the excluded industry.
Knowing this, each representative optimally delegates its decision-making authority to the
President and enjoys free trade welfare rather than playing this destructive bargaining sub-
game. Referring back to our castaway analogy, since each castaway has the same chance to
take possession of the rearm, they all prefer to ditch the gun rather than worrying about
who will get it rst.28
3.2 Asymmetric Congurations
In this subsection, we explore the implications of asymmetric congurations. We do so by
relaxing each industry characteristic one at a time. In Case 1, we allow for asymmetric
geographic distribution while keeping total outputs and status quo tari¤s equal across in-
dustries. We then analyze the e¤ects of asymmetric outputs in Case 2 while keeping the
other two variables equal across industries. Finally, in Case 3, we analyze asymmetric status
quo tari¤s while holding other variables symmetric across industries. These asymmetries
The respective ex post tari¤s in this case are
 i =
M   1
2M
, for the proposer industry,
 j = 0, for the
M   1
2
partner industries,
k =   
M
, for the
M   1
2
remaining industries.
28Note that Proposition 1 does not depend on the assumption that  is close to 1. If the three industries are
symmetric, then each industrys ex ante expected welfare is just total welfare divided by 3. Since free trade
gives higher total welfare than any other tari¤ level, all industries will prefer free trade to the bargaining
outcome, and they will all vote for FTA.
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introduce a rich set of predictions regarding the FTA decision.
Case 1 Asymmetric industry dispersion
Without loss of generality, throughout Case 1, we assume n1
N
> n2
N
> n3
N
but still
Q1 = Q2 = Q3 and  s1 = 
s
2 = 
s
3. When industries are symmetrically distributed (hence
they have identical political representation in Congress), presidential veto does not play a
role since any two-industry coalition can reach 2=3 majority which is enough to bypass the
presidential veto. This is no longer true under asymmetric industry dispersion. In this case,
the legislative bargaining subgame depends on how the President practices her veto power.
For simplicity, we will assume that when using her veto power in the bargaining subgame,
the President commits to free trade such that she will veto proposals that dictate a tari¤
vector ( 1;  2;  3) 6= (0; 0; 0).29
Case 1a: n1
N
> 1
2
> n2
N
> n3
N
As before, since  s1 = 
s
2 = 
s
3 and the aggregate welfare is maximized at free trade prices,
if FTA is granted in the rst stage, the President chooses free trade and Congress approves
it. If FTA is not granted, we show that industry 1 does strictly better than free trade in the
bargaining subgame.
It is helpful to analyze this case in detail. Notice that industry 1 controls enough seats
to pass a proposal in Congress without the support of any other industry, where in such
a case it has to propose free trade due to the presence of presidential veto. However, as
we argue here, by forming a veto-proof majority with another industry, it will do strictly
better than its free trade payo¤. Consider the following observations. First, industry 1 has
to be a member of any winning coalition, otherwise no proposal will pass in Congress since
29The veto is not central to our analysis, and the most important results emerge with or without it. The
case with a veto without commitment is much more complicated, and we do not have a full characterization
of equilibrium in that case. As the exposition proceeds, we will note how the analysis changes with a
veto without commitment; full details are available upon request. Note that we do not assume that, when
proposing a trade policy under FTA, the President is committed to proposing only free trade; under some
cases, it is in her interest to propose something di¤erent in order to get an electoral majority. See Case 3 for
an example.
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n2+n3
N
< 1
2
. In other words, when either industry 2 or industry 3 is chosen as a proposer, they
have to choose industry 1 as a coalition partner with probability 1. Second, in the event
that industry 1, as a proposer, o¤ers a tari¤ vector that is di¤erent than free trade, it has
to get the support of one of the other two industries to override the presidential veto, since
n1
N
< 2
3
. There are two subcases to consider in forming such a veto-proof majority. In the
rst subcase, when 1
3
> n2
N
> n3
N
, industry 1 can randomize between industry 2 and industry
3 in choosing its coalition partner and thus has a very strong bargaining position. In fact,
in the limit as  goes to 1, it is easy to show that industry 1 can obtain its rst best, U1,
in equilibrium. In the second subcase, when n2
N
> 1
3
> n3
N
, as a proposer, industry 1 has to
choose industry 2 as a coalition partner. This implies that industry 1 cannot obtain its rst
best anymore, but even in that case, it can still do better than free trade. This is true since
unlike industry 2, it has to be a member of any winning coalition (Consider the case when
industry 3 is the proposer, for example.) These observations together entail that industry 1
can do better than free trade by forming a veto-proof coalition and hence will vote against
FTA in the rst stage.30
Lemma 3. In Case 1a, FTA does not pass, and industry 1 obtains a payo¤ in excess of its
free-trade payo¤ in the subsequent bargaining subgame.
Proof. See appendix.
Case 1b: 1
2
> n1
N
> n2
N
> 1
3
> n3
N
; Q1 = Q2 = Q3;  s1 = 
s
2 = 
s
3
This case is similar to the second subcase of Case 1a except that for a proposal to pass
in Congress, industry 1 does not have to be in every winning coalition anymore. This is true
since now industry 2 can form a coalition with industry 3 (n2+n3
N
> 1
2
) and propose free trade
(they cannot propose anything else since the presidential veto is binding). On the other hand,
only industries 1 and 2 can form a veto-proof majority to override the Presidents veto and
propose something other than free trade. These two observations imply that compared to
the second subcase of Case 1a, industry 1 has a weaker bargaining position whereas industry
30This result holds in the presence of a veto without commitment. Details are available on request.
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2 has a stronger bargaining position. In addition, although both industries 1 and 2 have
the option of forming a coalition with industry 3 and enjoying free trade welfare (since any
two-industry coalition involving industry 3 cannot override the presidential veto), they will
not do so because each can do strictly better if they form a coalition together and bypass
the presidential veto. Here, industry 3 is too small to be a valuable partner. On the other
hand, when industry 3 gets the chance to make a proposal, it will have to get a unanimous
consent from Congress. This is true since any two-industry coalition with industry 3 being
the proposer has to o¤er free trade but neither industry 1 nor industry 2 will accept this
proposal given their strong bargaining positions.
In short, in the bargaining subgame, both industries 1 and 2 have strong positions and
both will enjoy payo¤s that are above their corresponding free trade payo¤s. Hence, they
will vote against FTA and FTA will not pass.31
Lemma 4. In Case 1b, FTA does not pass, and both industries 1 and 2 obtain payo¤s in
excess of their free-trade payo¤s in the subsequent bargaining subgame.
Proof. See appendix.
Case 1c: 1
2
> n1
N
> 1
3
 n2
N
 n3
N
; Q1 = Q2 = Q3;  s1 = 
s
2 = 
s
3
This case is similar to the rst subcase of Case 1a except that industry 1 has no longer
majority in Congress and thus, does not have to be in every winning coalition. Industry 2
and industry 3 can form a coalition and propose free trade (since the presidential veto is
binding). On the other hand, industry 1 can, as before, randomize between industry 2 and
industry 3 in choosing its coalition partner and any coalition involving industry 1 makes the
Presidents veto power ine¤ective, since n1+nj
N
> 2
3
, for j = 2, 3.
In this case, although industries 2 and 3 have the option of forming a coalition together
and proposing free trade, being uncertain about who will be in the winning coalition when
industry 1 is the proposer will lead to an expected payo¤ that is worse than free trade for
31It can be shown that this result is reversed if (i) there is veto power without commitment, and (ii) the
status quo payo¤ for each industry is below the utility from the fully random SSPE. Details are available
upon request.
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both. As a result, in the bargaining subgame, industry 1 still has a strong position (although
cannot achieve its rst best) but industry 2 and industry 3 have a weak position such that
they do not obtain a payo¤ that is better than free trade. Hence, industry 2 and industry 3
will vote for FTA and given that n2+n3
N
> 1
2
, FTA will pass.32
Lemma 5 In Case 1c, FTA always passes in the rst stage, the President subsequently
proposes free trade and Congress agrees to it.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemmas 2 through 5 lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. When industries di¤er only in their geographic distribution, FTA will pass
if and only if 1
2
> n1
N
> 1
3
 n2
N
 n3
N
.
To summarize this section, in the event of asymmetric political clout due to di¤erences
in the njs, if one industry is dominant (Case 1a, with n1 > 12), then FTA is not granted.
This is analogous to the case in the introduction in which a bare majority of castaways are
unemployed ninjas; they know that they will win any competition for resources, so they
welcome the competition. The outcome for Case 1b is similar, because industries 1 and 2
can form a veto-proof majority but neither industries 1 and 3 nor industries 2 and 3 can.
Thus a bare majority in Congress have power over a minority. On the other hand, in Case
1c, no industry has a majority, and no industry needs more than one other partner to form a
veto-proof majority,33 so the distribution of bargaining power is relatively symmetric, and all
industries dread the inter-industry congressional bargaining process, thus FTA is granted.
Case 2 Asymmetric industry output
32It can be shown that this result still holds if (i) there is veto power without commitment, and (ii) the
status quo payo¤ for each industry is below the utility from the fully random SSPE. In addition, it still holds
if condition (ii) fails, provided that the partner welfare constraint binds in any winning coalition. Details
are available upon request.
33In Case 1c, unlike in Case 1b, even industry 3 can form a veto-proof coalition if it forms a partnership
with industry 1.
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Without loss of generality, throughout Case 2, we assume that Q1 > Q2 > Q3. As stated
earlier, since  s1 = 
s
2 = 
s
3 and the aggregate welfare is maximized at free trade prices, if
FTA is granted in the rst stage, the President chooses free trade and Congress approves it.
If FTA is not granted, larger industries that produce more output tend to benet less from
congressional negotiations over tari¤s than smaller industries.34 The reason is that such an
industry will generate fewer imports (since it will satisfy more of domestic demand from
domestic production), and so the tari¤ revenue produced by a given tari¤ will be small; but
this means that if a large industry is a member of the coalition that forms the tari¤ bill,
the coalition partner will receive little benet from a tari¤ on the large industry, and so will
be unwilling to agree to a high tari¤. As a result, the largest industry (industry 1) always
obtains a lower welfare under the legislative bargaining than under free trade if FTA is not
granted to the President. Hence, industry 1 always votes in favor of FTA. In addition, since
each industry has the same geographic dispersion and industry 2 produces more output than
industry 3, the nal decision to grant FTA depends on whether industry 2 is better o¤ under
FTA or not.
We show that if industry 2s output is large enough, industry 2 does worse under the
legislative bargaining than under free trade (which will result if FTA is granted) and therefore
industry 2 also votes in favor of FTA (in addition to industry 1) and FTA is granted. On
the other hand, if industry 2s output is small enough, then we can show that industry 2
does better (along with industry 3) under the legislative bargaining and therefore FTA is
not granted. We can state these outcomes in detail with the following proposition, which is
illustrated by Figure 2.
Proposition 3. When industries produce asymmetric outputs, FTA will not be granted if
Q2 <

2

1 
p
7
3
p
3

whereas FTA will be granted if Q2 > 3 and the President will choose free
trade. On the other hand, when 
2

1 
p
7
3
p
3

 Q2 < 3 , there is a critical value of Q3, say
Q3(Q2), a decreasing function of Q2, such that if Q3 < Q3, FTA is not granted; whereas if
34In particular, as we show in the appendix (see equation (12)), each industrys payo¤ is decreasing in its
own output and increasing in other industriesoutput.
25
Q3 > Q3, FTA is granted and free trade will be adopted by the President.
Proof. See appendix.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Another way of looking at this is, again, through the castaway analogy of the introduction.
Figure 2 shows that the region in which FTA is rejected is the lower-left-hand corner of the
cone under the 45 line. Since, by assumption, Q1 > Q2 > Q3 and Q1 + Q2 + Q3 = , this
is the same as saying that FTA will be granted provided that the largest industry is not too
large relative to the smaller industries. Again, it is asymmetry in power that leads FTA to
be rejected. In this case, holding constant the number of seats represented by each industry
(and thus the size of the population dependent on each industry), a larger industry has
less ability to compete for tari¤s, and thus less power in the bargaining subgame than a
smaller industry. If industry 1 is large enough relative to industries 2 and 3, the smaller two
industries understand that they can successfully gang up on it in the bargaining subgame,
just like the ninja castaways, and as a result have no interest in FTA.
Case 3 Asymmetric status quo tari¤s
Without loss of generality, throughout Case 3, we assume that  s1 >  s2 >  s3. There
are two points to make here. First, given that all industries are symmetrically dispersed
and their outputs are the same, each industry will have the same ex ante expected payo¤ in
the bargaining subgame (recall that we analyze the equilibrium when the discount factor is
approaching 1 in the limit, so one period gains or losses are unimportant). Since total welfare
is maximized under free trade, this implies that all industries will be worse o¤ under the
bargaining subgame compared to free trade. Second, once FTA has been granted, Congress
has the option to reject the Presidents proposal and return to the status quo. Therefore,
under FTA, the President cannot make two industries (which constitute the majority in
Congress) worse o¤ compared to the status quo. As a result, there are two possibilities to
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explore. In the rst scenario, if at least two industries prefer free trade to the status quo, the
President will choose free trade under FTA and since the ex ante expected payo¤ of each
industry is lower under the bargaining subgame compared to free trade, FTA will be given
in the rst stage. In the second scenario, if two of the three industries prefer the status quo
to free trade, then the President must o¤er a tari¤ vector that will not make the majority
of the industries worse o¤ compared to the status quo. In such a case, the President cannot
choose free trade but will choose a tari¤ vector that is in the neighborhood of free trade. As
we show in the appendix, all industries will still do strictly better under FTA than what they
expect to get under the legislative bargaining. This is true since due to harsh competition
between industries, the legislative bargaining makes the total available surplus shrink too
much whereas under FTA, the President still chooses a tari¤ vector that is around free trade
and thus the total surplus available is not as small as in the case of bargaining subgame.
These observations imply that under Case 3, all industries will vote for FTA, and FTA will
always be granted to the President.
Lets focus on the second scenario described above where two of the three industries prefer
the status quo to free trade. Since each industrys payo¤ is increasing in its own protection
and decreasing in other industriesprotection (see equation (14) in the appendix), these two
industries that prefer the status quo to free trade must be industries 1 and 2 (remember
 s1 >  s2 >  s3). This automatically implies that industry 3s status quo payo¤ is lower
compared to free trade (all three industries cannot be better o¤ under the status quo since
free trade maximizes the aggregate welfare). When FTA is granted, the President will o¤er
a tari¤ vector that is as close as possible to free trade while keeping median industrys
(industry 2) payo¤ constant at its status quo value. This makes industry 1 worse o¤ and
industry 3 better o¤ compared to the status quo. Notice that even in this case, in addition
to industries 2 and 3, industry 1 also prefers FTA, since it would do even worse under the
legislative bargaining if FTA had not been granted. These results are outlined in detail in
Proposition 4.
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Proposition 4. When industries di¤er only in their status quo tari¤s, FTA is always
granted. However, unlike before, the President cannot always choose free trade when FTA
is granted. In particular, when  s2 >
(1+
p
3)
6
or  s2 <
(1 
p
3)
6
, free trade will be chosen by
the President. On the other hand, if (
1 p3)
6
  s2  (
1+
p
3)
6
, there is a critical value of
 s3, say 
s
3(
s
1; 
s
2), which is decreasing in 
s
1 and increasing in 
s
2, such that if 
s
3 < 
s
3, the
President will o¤er a tari¤ vector P 6= (0; 0; 0) that makes the median industry (industry
2) indi¤erent to the status quo, whereas if  s3 >  s3, the President chooses free trade.
Proof. See appendix.
We can summarize Case 3 as follows. Because in this case each industry controls the same
number of seats and produces the same level of output, power is symmetrically allocated in
the bargaining subgame. Each castaway has the same probability of acquiring the gun. As a
result, every member of Congress prefers FTA to the bargaining subgame, and so FTA will
always be granted.
One wrinkle appears that is not present in Cases 1 and 2, namely that under FTA the
President may not o¤er free trade. If there is enough asymmetry in initial tari¤s, it is quite
possible that a majority of industries with high tari¤s will prefer the status quo to free trade,
and so the President will be forced to make the best of FTA by o¤ering the closest thing to
it that makes the median industry as well o¤ under the status quo. This involves letting that
median industry keep a positive tari¤, while saddling the other industries with a negative
tari¤. If the median industry only slightly prefers the status quo to free trade, then the
tari¤ vector o¤ered will be only a slight perturbation away from free trade. This outcome
is summarized on Figure 3, which shows, for a given value of  s1, the values of 
s
2 and 
s
3 for
which the President will propose a tari¤ vector di¤erent from free trade the region marked
P 6= 0 in the gure. The right-hand boundary of this gure is  s1 (which we have set at
the value  s1 = 0:3 for illustrative purposes), due to our convention that 
s
1 >  s2 >  s3. The
upward-sloping curve plots the values of  s3(
s
1; 
s
2) = 
s
3(0:3; 
s
2), the critical value of 
s
3
below which industry 2 prefers the status quo to free trade. If we allow  s1 to increase, this
curve will shift down (since  s3(
s
1; 
s
2) is decreasing in 
s
1) at the same time as the 
s
1 = 0:3
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boundary shifts to the right. The point is that for a given value of  s1, industry 2 is more
likely to acquiesce to free trade, the lower is its initial tari¤ and the higher is industry 3s
initial tari¤. In addition, if the initial point is, say, point A, so that industry 2 would
refuse free trade, then if we increase  s1 su¢ ciently, the 
s
3(
s
1; 
s
2) curve will shift down until
eventually A is above the curve. At that point, industry 2 will prefer free trade to the status
quo, and so the President will o¤er free trade and it will be accepted.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze an important institution of trade policy: Fast-track authority
(FTA), by which Congress delegates a portion of its trade-policy authority to the executive
branch, and which has been a feature of almost every major trade agreement entered into
by the United States. We suggest an interpretation in which FTA is used by Congress to
forestall destructive competition between its members for protectionist rents, competition
that can leave a majority or even all members of Congress worse o¤ ex ante. In our model,
each district hosts an industry and therefore each districts welfare is closely related to the
industry operating in it. We model the congressional bargaining game as in Baron and
Ferejohn (1989), and analyze the conditions under which a majority of members of Congress
will choose to vote for FTA.
Our analysis shows the following. First, FTA is never granted if an industry is operating
in the majority of districts. This is true since if an industry operates in a majority of
districts, it can benet at the expense of other districts under no FTA. Second, the more
equally distributed are the industries across districts and the more similar are the industries
sizes, the more likely it is that FTA is granted. This is true since competition between rents
is most punishing when bargaining power is symmetrically distributed, and in that case the
ex ante expected welfare of each district is lower when Congress does not grant FTA to the
President. Third, if existing levels of protection are very di¤erent across industries, even if
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FTA is granted, it may not lead to free trade because a majority of industries may prefer
the status quo to free trade.
Notice that even though we use a small open economy model in which prices are taken as
given, the logic should apply to the more realistic case of a large country negotiating a trade
agreement, in which case the issues of strategic bargaining that are the focus of Conconi
et al. (2012) would also arise. The model can also be extended to the case of a President
who does not care about the social welfare of all persons equally. It can be shown, for
example, that, in the fully symmetric model, if the President cares only about maximizing
the welfare of industry i, then FTA will pass if and only if the status quo welfare is no less
than welfare under the SSPE, in which case non-zero tari¤s favoring industry i will result;
and if the President cares about maximizing the sum of welfare of two of the industries, FTA
will always pass. In the latter case, the two favored industries are happy to delegate policy
making power to the President, who will maximize their joint welfare at the expense of the
other industry. Details are available upon request.
Empirical investigation of these questions is far beyond the scope of this paper, but the
prediction regarding the e¤ect of symmetry in industrial distribution should be amenable to
time-series techniques. Census data, for example, could be used in combination with data
on Congressional districts to measure the degree to which the geographical distribution of
industries deviates from symmetry; naturally this varies over time as movements of capital
and labor arbitrage away di¤erences in factor prices across regions (promoting symmetry)
and as boom industries from time to time arise in particular locations such as Silicon Valley
(promoting departures from symmetry). This could be combined with time-varying political
controls such as are the focus of the empirical work in Lohmann and OHalloran (1994) to
test whether or not, ceteris paribus, fast-track has been more likely to be granted in periods
with more symmetry.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. Here, we present a general proof for any industry conguration. When
a legislator representing industry i is selected as the proposer and chooses industry j 6= i as
the coalition partner, we denote the chosen tari¤s as  = ( iji ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ), where 
ij
i is the tari¤
industry i gets,  ijj is the tari¤ industry j gets and 
ij
k is the tari¤ industry k 6= i; j gets.
Now, suppose a legislator representing industry i is selected as the proposer and he
chooses industry j 6= i as the coalition partner. His maximization problem is
max
 iji ;
ij
j ;
ij
k
wi(
ij
i ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) s.t. wj(
ij
i ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) > (1  )wj( s) + vj,
The recognized legislator will choose  such that the constraint is satised with equality.
Furthermore, in the limit as  ! 1, the constraint can be rewritten as wj( ) = vj. Hence,
the maximization problem becomes
max

wi(
ij
i ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) s.t. wj(
ij
i ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) = vj.
where
wi(
ij
i ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) = wi(
s) +
"
( iji    si ) 
1
2
X
l=i;j;k
h 
 ijl +Ql
2   ( sl +Ql)2i
#
,
wj(
ij
i ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) = wj(
s) +
"
( ijj    sj) 
1
2
X
l=i;j;k
h 
 ijl +Ql
2   ( sl +Ql)2i
#
.
The Lagrangian can be expressed as
L( iji ;  ijj ;  ijk ) =
"
( iji    si ) 
1
2
X
l=i;j;k
h 
 ijl +Ql
2   ( sl +Ql)2i
#
+ij
"
( ijj    sj) 
1
2
X
l=i;j;k
h 
 ijl +Ql
2   ( sl +Ql)2i  vj
#
,
where ij is the Lagrange multiplier when a legislator representing industry i is selected as
the proposer and he chooses industry j 6= i as the coalition partner. It represents the cost
to the proposing legislator of obtaining the additional votes needed to pass the proposal.
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The rst-order conditions, after simplication, are
 iji =

1 + ij
 Qi,
 ijj =
ij
1 + ij
 Qj,
 ijk =  Qk.
We rst show that, in an SSPE in which all proposers employ mixed strategies in choosing
their coalition partners, the value of ij is independent of the identity of the proposer and of
the coalition partner, i.e., ij =  for all i 6= j, i; j = 1; 2; 3. This follows from the following
two observations. First, a legislator would employ a mixed strategy in choosing a coalition
partner only when the ex post payo¤ his district enjoys is the same under each alternative.
In other words, when a legislator representing industry i is selected as the proposer, he
randomly picks an industry as a coalition partner if, for all i 6= j 6= k,
wi(
ij
i ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) = wi(
ik
i ; 
ik
j ; 
ik
k )
, ( iji    si ) 
1
2
X
l=i;j;k
h 
 ijl +Ql
2   ( sl +Ql)2i
= ( iki    si ) 
1
2
X
l=i;j;k
h 
 ikl +Ql
2   ( sl +Ql)2i .
Using the equilibrium values of ( iji ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) and (
ik
i ; 
ik
j ; 
ik
k ), we have
2
1 + ij
  1
2
24

1 +
 
ij
2
2 
1 + ij
2
35 = 2
1 + ik
  1
2
24

1 +
 
ik
2
2 
1 + ik
2
35 .
It is easy to see that this is possible only if ij = ik. Second, when industry j is chosen
as a coalition partner, the ex post welfare it is o¤ered would be independent of the identity
of the proposer, because whoever is the proposer always o¤ers an ex post welfare of vj to
this industry, otherwise the proposal is rejected. Thus, for any i 6= j 6= k,
wj(
ij
i ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) = wj(
kj
i ; 
kj
j ; 
kj
k )
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, ( ijj    sj) 
1
2
X
l=i;j;k
h 
 ijl +Ql
2   ( sl +Ql)2i
= ( kjj    sj) 
1
2
X
l=i;j;k

 kjl +Ql
2
  ( sl +Ql)2

.
Using the equilibrium values of ( iji ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) and (
kj
i ; 
kj
j ; 
kj
k ), we have
ij2
1 + ij
  1
2
24

1 +
 
ij
2
2 
1 + ij
2
35 = kj2
1 + kj
  1
2
24

1 +
 
kj
2
2 
1 + kj
2
35 .
Again, this is possible only if ij = kj. Together with the earlier observation, ij = kj =
ik, which implies that ij =  for all i 6= j, i; j = 1; 2; 3. Next, we nd the equilibrium value
of  in an SSPE in which all proposers employ mixed strategies in choosing their coalition
partners. We rst write down the equilibrium ex post per-capita welfare in three distinct
cases.
(i) when the districts that produce good j are selected as the proposer:
wproposerj = wj(
s) +
"
2
1 + 
  ( sj +Qj) 
1
2
  
1 + 2

2
(1 + )2
 
X
l=i;j;k
( sl +Ql)
2
!#
.
(ii) when the districts that produce good j are selected as a coalition partner:
wpartnerj = wj(
s) +
"
2
1 + 
  ( sj +Qj) 
1
2
  
1 + 2

2
(1 + )2
 
X
l=i;j;k
( sl +Ql)
2
!#
.
(iii) when the districts that produce good j are left outside the coalition:
woutsidej = wj(
s) +
"
 ( sj +Qj) 
1
2
  
1 + 2

2
(1 + )2
 
X
l=i;j;k
( sl +Ql)
2
!#
.
We next express the equilibrium continuation welfare of a district on a per capita basis.
To do so, we need to introduce randomization probabilities. Let sij denote the probability
that a legislator representing a district that produces good i chooses the districts producing
good j as a coalition partner. Then, vj can be expressed as
vj =
nj
N
[sjiw
proposer
j + (1  sji)wproposerj ] +
ni
N
[sijw
partner
j + (1  sij)woutsidej ]
+
nk
N
[skjw
partner
j + (1  skj)woutsidej ].
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After simplication, this becomes
vj = wj(
s)+
2
1 + 
nj
N
+

sij
ni
N
+ skj
nk
N



 ( sj+Qj) 
1
2
  
1 + 2

2
(1 + )2
 
X
l=i;j;k
( sl +Ql)
2
!
.
Next, observe that the maximization problem implies wpartnerj = vj (since the constraint
is binding in equilibrium). Hence, it must be true that
3X
j=1
wpartnerj =
3X
j=1
vj.
Also note that
3X
j=1
i6=k 6=j

sij
ni
N
+ skj
nk
N

=

s12
n1
N
+ s32
n3
N

+

s13
n1
N
+ s23
n2
N

+

s21
n2
N
+ s31
n3
N

= (s12 + s13)
n1
N
+ (s21 + s23)
n2
N
+ (s31 + s32)
n3
N
=
n1 + n2 + n3
N
= 1.
The condition
3P
j=1
wpartnerj =
3P
j=1
vj can now be expressed as
32
1 + 
  
3X
j=1
 
 sj +Qj
  3
2
  
1 + 2

2
(1 + )2
 
X
l=i;j;k
( sl +Ql)
2
!
=
2
1 + 
(1 + )  
3X
j=1
 
 sj +Qj
  3
2
  
1 + 2

2
(1 + )2
 
X
l=i;j;k
( sl +Ql)
2
!
,  = 1
2
.
So, the value of  can be determined without the knowledge of the randomization prob-
abilities. Plugging the equilibrium value of  into the tari¤s we found earlier gives
 iji =
2
3
 Qi,
 ijj =

3
 Qj,
34
 ijk =  Qk.
The continuation payo¤ of each industry can be determined easily by the condition
vj = w
partner
j . Evaluating w
partner
j at  = 1=2 leads to
vj = wj(
s) +
"
2
3
  ( sj +Qj) 
1
2
 
52
9
 
X
l=i;j;k
( sl +Ql)
2
!#
. (8)
With Q1 = Q2 = Q3 = 3 , the equilibrium tari¤s are
 iji =

3
,
 ijj = 0,
 ijk =  

3
.
The nal step of the proof is to show that there is an interior solution to all of the
randomization probabilities (this is what we assumed at the beginning of the proof). Since
the continuation per-period, per-capita welfare is equal to ex post welfare when chosen as a
coalition partner (by the maximization problem), i.e., vj = w
partner
j , we have
2
1 + 
nj
N
+

sij
ni
N
+ skj
nk
N



=
2
1 + 
.
Evaluated at  = 1=2, this becomes
sij
ni
N
+ skj
nk
N
= 1  2nj
N
.
For simplicity, let s12 = s1, s23 = s2 and s31 = s3. Then,
s1
n1
N
+ (1  s3)n3
N
= 1  2n2
N
,
s2
n2
N
+ (1  s1)n1
N
= 1  2n3
N
,
s3
n3
N
+ (1  s2)n2
N
= 1  2n1
N
.
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It is easy to check that, when n3
N
 n2
N
 n1
N
 1
2
, there is an interior solution in which
si 2 [0; 1] for all i. To see this, x s3 and express s1 and s2 in terms of s3
s1 =
1  2n2
N
  (1  s3)n3N
n1
N
,
s2 = 1 
1  2n1
N
  s3 n3N
n2
N
.
Any value of s3 2
h
0;
1 2n1
N
n3
N
i
yields s1; s2 2 [0; 1].
When n1
N
= n2
N
= n3
N
= 1
3
, the above system reduces to s1 = s2 = s3, so any s3 2 [0; 1] is
a solution.
Proof of Proposition 1. To express the equilibrium continuation payo¤ as a deviation
from an industrys free trade payo¤, evaluate equation (8) at  s = (0; 0; 0) to obtain
vj = wj(0) +
"
(

3
 Qj)  1
2
 
52
9
 
X
l=i;j;k
Q2l
!#
. (9)
Evaluating equation (9) at Qi = Qj = Qk = 3 leads to
vj = wj(0)  
2
9
. (10)
Hence, for all j = 1; 2; 3, vj < wj(0) since  > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. Here, we prove that v1 > w1 (0), so FTA does not pass. Suppose on the
contrary that FTA passes. Given that n1
N
> 1
2
, this is possible only when the representatives
of industry 1 say yes to FTA, which requires v1  w1 (0). Since industries 2 and 3 are too
small to form a coalition together, both will choose industry 1 as their partner when either
of them becomes the proposer. For a given value of  < 1, let vi () indicate the equilibrium
per-capita continuation payo¤ of industry i = 1; 2; 3. Both industries 2 and 3 will o¤er a
per-period payo¤ of (1  )w1( s) + v1 () to industry 1. Given that industry 1 can always
propose free trade when it is the proposer, we have
v1 ()  n1
N
w1 (0) +
(n2 + n3)
N
[(1  )w1( s) + v1 ()] .
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Solving for v1 gives
v1 ()  n1
N    (n2 + n3)w1 (0) +
(n2 + n3)
N    (n2 + n3)(1  )w1(
s).
Denote the right-hand side of the above inequality as vmin1 (). Note that lim
!1
vmin1 () = w1 (0)
(since w1( s)  w1 (0), vmin1 () approaches w1 (0) from below as  ! 1).
Dene ~wi(v), < 7! <, by
~wi(v)  max

wi( ) subject to wj( ) = (1  )wj( s) + v, (11)
where i = 1; 2; 3, and i 6= j. In words, ~wi(v) is the (per-period) ex post payo¤ that industry
i is able to obtain for itself as the proposer when the equilibrium continuation payo¤ of the
coalition partner industry j here is v (assuming i and j can form a coalition that overturns
a possible veto by the President). This problem is symmetric for all players since nis do
not matter once a proposer is selected. By equation (6), then, it follows that ~wi(v)  wi (0)
is the same for all i = 1; 2 or 3.35 Clearly, the derivative ~w0i(v) < 0, so ~wi(v) is a strictly
decreasing function of v.36 Also note that ~w has the property that lim
!1
~wi ( ~wj(v)) = v for any
value of v. In other words, if, say, industry 2 has a continuation payo¤ of v2 = ~w2(v), then
industry 1 can obtain at most v for itself when it is the proposer and chooses industry 2 as
the coalition partner.
Since we have assumed that all industries are very patient, we will focus on the limiting
case  ! 1 in the remainder of the proof. Unless otherwise stated, all payo¤s are evaluated
in the limit as  ! 1 (so, we are not going to use limargument unless necessary).
There are two subcases to consider. First, suppose that n2
N
 1
3
. This is the scenario
in which industry 1 can form a veto-proof coalition with either of the other two industries.
Given that v1  w1 (0), industry 2s as well as industry 3s proposer payo¤ will be higher
than free trade. This follows from the observation that industry 2 (industry 3) can always
make itself better o¤ than free trade by proposing a tari¤ vector that provides negative
35Note that we do not limit the domestic prices of the manufacturing goods to be identical. Hence, wi (0)s
need not be equal.
36If  is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for the optimization in expression (11), then the envelope theorem
shows that ~w0i(v) =   < 0.
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protection to industry 3 (industry 2) while providing free trade welfare to industry 1, i.e.,
~wj (w1 (0)) > wj (0), j = 2; 3. Given v1  w1 (0), this implies that ~wj 6=1 (v1) > wj 6=1 (0)
a fortiori. It also directly follows from the same observation that the industry that is left
outside the winning coalition will surely obtain a payo¤ that is less than its free trade payo¤.
For i 6= j 6= k, denote wijk as the payo¤ industry k receives when industry i is the proposer
and it chooses industry j as the coalition partner. The value of wijk may certainly depend
on the identity of the proposer, but it is always true that wijk < wk (0). When industry 1 is
the proposer, it will either choose free trade or choose (possibly with a mixed strategy) one
of the other two industries to form a veto-proof coalition, so the highest industry j 6= 1 can
obtain is max fvj; wj (0)g. So,
vj  nj
N
~wj (v1) +
n1
N
max fvj; wj (0)g+ nk
N
wk1j , j 6= k 6= 1.
Since ~wj (v1) > wj (0) > wk1j , it follows that vj < ~wj (v1), j = 2; 3. This means that
~w1(vj) > ~w1( ~wj(v1)) = v1, where we have used the two properties of ~wi described before:
~w0i(v) < 0 and ~wi( ~wj(v)) = v. Given that v1  vmin1 , ~w1(vj) > vmin1 = w1 (0), so industry 1,
as a proposer, would choose to form a coalition with one of the other two industries rather
than proposing free trade. This implies
v1 =
n1
N
max f ~w1(v2); ~w1(v3)g+ (n2 + n3)
N
v1,
which, after simplifying, reduces to v1 = max f ~w1(v2); ~w1(v3)g. However, this constitutes a
contradiction since we had earlier found that ~w1(vj) > v1 for j = 2; 3. Hence, it must be
that v1 > w1 (0) when n2N  13 .
The other possible scenario is n2
N
> 1
3
. In this case, a coalition between industries 1 and
3 is not veto-proof. So, industry 1 needs the support of industry 2 if it wants to obtain
a payo¤ that is strictly higher than free trade. First, assume that v2  w2 (0). In this
case, industry 1 would always form a coalition with industry 2 whenever it gets to make a
proposal, because ~w1(v2) > w1(0) as discussed earlier. Industry 2 would also always form a
coalition with industry 1 since we have v1  w1 (0) by assumption. Industry 3, on the other
hand, makes a proposal that will be accepted by all members of Congress, because given
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that v1  w1 (0) and v2  w2 (0), industry 3 can obtain a payo¤ at least as much as its free
trade payo¤. Hence,
v1 =
n1
N
~w1(v2) +
(n2 + n3)
N
v1.
This expression implies that v1 = ~w1(v2) > w1(0), which is a contradiction to the initial
assertion that v1  w1 (0).
Next, assume that v2 > w2 (0). Note that with v2 > w2 (0) and vmin1 = w1 (0), industry
3 cannot obtain a payo¤ that is better than free trade by making a proposal that will be
accepted by all industries. Hence, it must be that industry 3 proposes free trade when it
gets to be the proposer, and given that v1  w1 (0), industry 1 agrees to it. Given that
v1  w1 (0), industry 2 strictly prefers to form a coalition with industry 1. Industry 1, on
the other hand, would form a coalition with industry 2 if ~w1(v2) > w1(0), would randomize
between forming a coalition with 2 and proposing free trade if ~w1(v2) = w1(0), and would
propose free trade if ~w1(v2) < w1(0). So, the highest industry 2 can expect is v2. Thus,
v2  n2
N
~w2(v1) +
n1
N
v2 +
n3
N
w2(0).
Given that v1  w1 (0), ~w2(v1) > w2(0), so the above expression implies v2 < ~w2(v1). Using
~w0i(v) < 0 and ~w1( ~w2(v)) = v, then, ~w1(v2) > ~w1( ~w2(v1)) = v1. Given that v1  vmin1 =
w1 (0), we reach ~w1(v2) > w1 (0). Thus,
v1 =
n1
N
~w1(v2) +
n2
N
v1 +
n3
N
w1 (0) ,
which implies that v1 > w1 (0). This again constitutes a contradiction. Hence, it must be
that v1 > w1 (0).
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose on the contrary that FTA passes. Note that a coalition of
industries 1 and 2 will have enough seats to bypass presidential veto, whereas a coalition
between industries 1 and 3 or industries 2 and 3 is not veto-proof. Hence, industry 3 has
to either propose a bill that is unanimously agreed on, or propose free trade and get the
support of at least one of the other two industries. As in the proof of Lemma 3, all payo¤s
in the following are evaluated in the limit as  goes to 1 unless otherwise stated.
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First assume that both industries 1 and 2 say yes to FTA (industry 3 may say yes or no;
it does not make a di¤erence for what follows). This requires that both industries expect
a payo¤ that is not better than free trade in the bargaining subgame, i.e., v1  w1 (0)
and v2  w2 (0). Given that v1  w1 (0), industry 2 would always form a coalition with
industry 1 whenever it gets to make a proposal. This follows from the observation that
industry 2 can always make itself better o¤ than free trade by proposing a tari¤ vector that
provides negative protection to industry 3 while providing free trade welfare to industry 1,
i.e., ~w2 (w1 (0)) > w2 (0), where ~wi is as dened in expression (11) in the proof of Lemma 3.
Given v1  w1 (0), this implies that ~w2 (v1) > w2 (0). The same reasoning is true for industry
1, too. That is, industry 1 would always form a coalition with industry 2 whenever it gets
to make a proposal. Industry 3, on the other hand, makes a proposal that will be accepted
by all members of Congress, because given that v1  w1 (0) and v2  w2 (0), industry 3 can
obtain a payo¤ that is at least as much as its free trade payo¤. Hence,
v1 =
n1
N
~w1(v2) +
(n2 + n3)
N
v1,
v2 =
n2
N
~w2(v1) +
(n1 + n3)
N
v2.
These expressions imply that v1 = ~w1(v2) > w1(0) and v2 = ~w1(v1) > w2(0), which is a
contradiction to the initial assertion that v1  w1 (0) and v2  w2 (0). Thus, both industries
1 and 2 cannot do worse than free trade in the bargaining subgame.
Next, assume v1 > w1 (0), v2  w2 (0) and v3  w3 (0), so that industries 2 and 3 say
yes to FTA. Under these conditions, industry 1 would again always form a coalition with
industry 2 whenever it gets to be the proposer in the bargaining subgame. Industry 2 may
choose to form a coalition with industry 1 if ~w2(v1)  w2(0), or propose free trade and get
the support of industry 3. So, industry 2 can assure a payo¤ of w2(0) at the minimum in
either case. Finally, industry 3 may make a proposal that will be accepted by all members
of Congress, or propose free trade and get the support of industry 2. First, suppose that
industry 3 makes a proposal that will be accepted by all industries. For a given ,
v2 ()  n2
N
w2(0) +
(n1 + n3)
N
[(1  )w2( s) + v2 ()] ,
40
which, after solving for v2, becomes
v2 ()  n2
N    (n1 + n3)w2 (0) +
(n1 + n3)
N    (n1 + n3)(1  )w2(
s).
Similar to the proof of Lemma 3, denote the right-hand side of the above inequality as
vmin2 (). Note that lim
!1
vmin2 () = w2 (0).
Now, observe that with v1 > w1 (0) and vmin2 = w2 (0), industry 3 cannot obtain a payo¤
that is better than free trade by making a proposal that will be accepted by all industries.
Hence, industry 3 proposes free trade when it is the proposer.
Given that industry 3 proposes free trade when it gets to be the proposer,
v1 =
n1
N
~w1(v2) +
n2
N
v1 +
n3
N
w1 (0) .
Since ~w1(v2) > w1 (0), this expression implies that v1 < ~w1(v2). As a result, ~w2 (v1) >
~w2 ( ~w1(v2)) = v2. Since v2  vmin2 = w2 (0), it follows that ~w2 (v1) > w2 (0). In other words,
when industry 2 is the proposer, it chooses to form a coalition with industry 1 rather than
proposing free trade and obtaining the support of industry 3. Hence,
v2 =
n2
N
~w2(v1) +
n1
N
v2 +
n3
N
w2 (0) .
which implies v2 > w2 (0), so a contradiction.
The last scenario under which FTA would be granted is when v1  w1 (0), v2 > w2 (0)
and v3  w3 (0). This scenario is identical to the preceding scenario with the identities of
industries 1 and 2 switched. So, again, it will lead to a contradiction. As a result, in the
limit as  ! 1, both industries 1 and 2 must be doing strictly better than free trade in the
bargaining subgame, and therefore, both would say no to FTA in the rst stage.
Proof of Lemma 5. In this case, similar to Case 1b, industries 2 and 3 have the option of
forming a coalition with each other and proposing free trade. However, now, in contrast to
Case 1b, industry 1 can form a veto-proof coalition with either of the other two industries,
so industry 2 will not have a strong bargaining position anymore. Here, we show that
both industries 2 and 3 do worse than free trade in the legislative bargaining subgame (i.e.,
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vj  wj (0) for j = 2; 3), so they vote in favor of FTA in the rst stage. For convenience, all
payo¤s are evaluated in the limit as  ! 1 in the remainder of the proof.
Suppose, on the contrary, that vj > wj (0) for j = 2, j = 3 or for both. Without any
loss of generality, assume v2 w2 (0)  v3 w3 (0) (all of the following equally applies when
identities of 2 and 3 are switched). There are two possibilities to consider: v2   w2 (0) 
v3   w3 (0) > 0 and v2   w2 (0) > 0  v3   w3 (0).
First, suppose that v2   w2 (0)  v3   w3 (0) > 0. This implies that v1 < w1 (0). This
is so since total surplus is maximized at free trade, implying that
3P
i=1
(vi   wi(0))  0. As
a result, industries 2 and 3 always form a coalition with industry 1 whenever they get to
make a proposal, because they can ensure a payo¤ in excess of free trade by doing so, i.e.,
~wj 6=1 (v1) > wj 6=1 (0), where the function ~wj is as dened in expression (11) in the proof of
Lemma 3. Note that, by the symmetry of ~wi, ~w2(v1) w2 (0) = ~w3(v1) w3 (0). Industry 1
will have a strict preference for industry 3 as a coalition partner if v2 w2 (0) > v3 w3 (0),
and will randomize between the two if v2   w2 (0) = v3   w3 (0) (in which case ~w1(v2) =
~w1(v3)). In either case, we can write the proposer payo¤ of industry 1 as ~w1(v3). Thus, the
continuation payo¤ of industry 1 can be expressed as
v1 =
n1
N
~w1(v3) +
(n2 + n3)
N
v1,
which, after solving for v1, becomes
v1 = ~w1(v3).
In other words, as  ! 1, industry 1 obtains the same payo¤ in all possible outcomes of
the legislative bargaining. But, then, using the property ~wi( ~wj(v)) = v, it follows that
~w3(v1) = ~w3( ~w1(v3)) = v3. Given that industry 3 will be left out of the winning coalition
and obtain a payo¤ w213 < w3 (0) when industry 2 is the proposer, and will obtain at most
v3 when industry 1 is the proposer, we have the following
v3  n3
N
~w3(v1) +
n1
N
v3 +
n2
N
w213 .
Given that ~w3(v1) = v3, the above condition implies that v3  w213 < w3 (0), which is a
contradiction to the initial assertion that we made.
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The second possible scenario is v2 w2 (0) > 0  v3 w3 (0). In this case, industry 1 will
have a strict preference for industry 3 as a coalition partner. First, suppose ~w2(v1) w2 (0) =
~w3(v1) w3 (0) > 0 so that both industries 2 and 3 choose to form a coalition with industry 1
whenever they get to make a proposal. Following the same steps as in the previous scenario,
it is easy to reach v1 = ~w1(v3) and ~w3(v1) = v3. The continuation payo¤ of industry 2 can
be written as
v2 =
n2
N
~w2(v1) +
n1
N
w132 +
n3
N
w312 .
Given that ~w2(v1)  w2 (0) = ~w3(v1)  w3 (0) and that ~w3(v1) = v3, we have
v2 =
n2
N
(w2 (0) + v3   w3 (0)) + n1
N
w132 +
n3
N
w312 .
Since v3   w3 (0)  0 by assumption and also w132 < w2 (0) and w312 < w2 (0), it follows
that v2 < w2 (0), which is a contradiction. Next, suppose that ~w2(v1)   w2 (0) = ~w3(v1)  
w3 (0)  0. In this case, industry 2 will obtain a payo¤ of w2 (0) when it is the proposer
(it will randomize between forming a coalition with industry 1 and proposing free trade if
~w2(v1) = w2 (0); otherwise, it will propose free trade and industry 3 will say yes). Industry
3, on the other hand, will always form a coalition with industry 1 (because, given that
v2 > w2 (0), industry 2 would not agree to free trade). Hence, v2 can be expressed as
v2 =
n2
N
w2 (0) +
n1
N
w132 +
n3
N
w312 .
Since w132 < w2 (0) and w
31
2 < w2 (0), it follows that v2 < w2 (0), so again a contradiction.
Hence, vj  wj (0) for j = 2; 3, and therefore both industries 2 and 3 vote in favor of FTA
in the rst stage.
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that Q1 + Q2 + Q3 = . Given that the industries are
symmetrically dispersed, the legislative bargaining has a full randomization SSPE. Hence,
the continuation per-capita payo¤ of districts that produce good i is the same as in equation
(9) (which is given in the proof of Proposition 1)
vi = wi(0) + (

3
 Qi)  1
2
 
5
9
2  
X
l=i;j;k
Q2l
!
. (12)
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There are couple of observations to make here. First, from equation (12),
3P
i=1
(vi wi(0))  0
since total surplus is maximized at free trade. As a result, if FTA is given to the President,
she will always choose free trade since for each industry, free trade is not worse than any
symmetric status quo tari¤ vector ( =  s) that would continue to prevail in case the
Presidents proposal is rejected. Second, given our assumption that Q1 > Q2 > Q3, as
long as we determine the range in which v2   w2(0) > 0, this will automatically imply
v3   w3(0) > 0 and hence FTA will not be given. This is true since each districts payo¤ is
decreasing in its own industrys total output and increasing in other industriestotal output.
Therefore, if industry 2 does better than free trade, then industry 3, which has a lower
output than industry 2, will do better than free trade, too. In addition, industry 1 cannot
be made better o¤ than free trade and therefore always votes yes to FTA.37
To analyze the possible cases in detail, lets rewrite Q1 as Q1 =    Q2   Q3. If we
substitute this value in equation (12) and solve for a critical value of Q3, Q3, as a function
of Q2 that makes v2   w2(0) = 0, we get
Q3 =
1
2
(  Q2) 
p
54Q2   112   27Q22
6
. (13)
We can see from equation (13) that dQ3
dQ2
< 0. In addition, we know that 0  Q3  Q2.
Using these conditions in equation (13), we can determine the region where FTA is given
and where it is not given.
Case 2a: Q2 > 3 ;
n1
N
= n2
N
= n3
N
= 1
3
;  s1 = 
s
2 = 
s
3
It is possible to show that, when Q2 > 3 , industries 1 and 2 cannot do better than free
trade and hence FTA will be granted.38 Since each industrys payo¤ is decreasing in its own
output, we need to nd the upper bound of Q2 that satises equation (13). This gives us
37This is easy to see since the best possible scenario for industry 1 (given that Q1 > Q2 > Q3) is the one
where Q1 = Q2 = Q3 and this corresponds to fully symmetric case where each industry prefers free trade to
the bargaining subgame.
38Given our assumption that Q1 > Q2 > Q3, under this case, industries 1 and 2 cannot do better than
free trade for sure. On the other hand, depending on the value of Q3, industry 3 can do better or worse than
free trade.
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the maximum amount of Q2 that makes industry 2 indi¤erent between granting FTA or not
granting FTA. Above that level, it is not possible for industry 2 to do better than free trade,
thus FTA will be granted. Since dQ3
dQ2
< 0, we can nd the upper bound of Q2 by setting
Q3 equal to zero in equation (13), which gives us Q2 =

3
. From equation (13), any Q2 > 3
requires Q3 < 0 for industry 2 to do strictly better than free trade by not granting FTA,
which is not possible.
Case 2b: Q2 < 2

1 
p
7
3
p
3

; n1
N
= n2
N
= n3
N
= 1
3
;  s1 = 
s
2 = 
s
3
It is possible to show that, when Q2 < 2

1 
p
7
3
p
3

, industries 2 and 3 do better than
free trade and as a result FTA will not be granted. Since each industrys payo¤ is decreasing
in its own total output, we need to nd the lower bound of Q2 that satises equation (13).
This gives us the minimum amount of Q2 that makes industry 2 indi¤erent between granting
FTA and not granting FTA. Below that level, it is always possible for industry 2 to do better
than free trade, thus FTA will not be granted. Since dQ3
dQ2
< 0 and Q3  Q2, we can nd the
lower bound of Q2 by setting Q2 = Q3 in equation (13), which gives us Q2 =

2

1 
p
7
3
p
3

.
From equation (13), any Q2 < 2

1 
p
7
3
p
3

requires a value of Q3  bQ, where the value ofbQ is such that Q2 < bQ, for industry 2 to benet from not granting FTA, which is always
satised since Q3  Q2.
Case 2c: 
2

1 
p
7
3
p
3

 Q2 < 3 ; n1N = n2N = n3N = 13 ;  s1 =  s2 =  s3
In this case, we again use equation (13). For any value of Q2 such that 2

1 
p
7
3
p
3


Q2 <

3
, if Q3 < Q3, industries 2 and 3 do better than free trade and FTA is not given. This
is true since dQ3
dQ2
< 0 and each industrys payo¤ is decreasing in its own output. As a result,
a value of Q3 < Q3, for a given value of Q2, results in a strictly higher welfare for industry 2
when FTA is not granted. On the other hand, if Q3 > Q3, then industry 2 cannot be made
better o¤ than free trade and FTA will be given (recall that industry 1 always votes YES to
FTA).39
39In this case, industry 3 can do better or worse than free trade depending on the value of Q3.
45
Proof of Proposition 4. In the rst part of the proof, we will assume that FTA is always
granted to the President and analyze the Presidents problem accordingly. In the second
part, we show that all three industries are better o¤ under FTA relative to the bargaining
subgame, hence FTA is always granted.
Given Assumption 1, we have
 
3
  si 
2
3
.
Using equation (5), each districts expected welfare is given by
wi   wi( s) =
"
( i    si ) 
1
2
X
l=i;j;k
 
 l +

3
2
 

 sl +

3
2!#
.
Moreover, using equation (6), we can also write each districts welfare as
wi   wi(0) =  i   1
2
X
l=i;j;k
 
 l +

3
2
 


3
2!
.
Then, by subtracting the former equation from the latter, we get
wi(
s)  wi(0) =  si  

3
X
l=i;j;k
 sl  
X
l=i;j;k
( sl )
2
2
. (14)
There are a couple of things to note here. First,
3P
i=1
(wi(
s) wi(0))  0 sincemax

3P
i=1
wi( ) =
3P
i=1
wi(0). Therefore, there is at least one industry that will be worse o¤under any status quo
relative to free trade (except if the status quo is free trade). Second, given our assumption
that  s1 >  s2 >  s3, and since each industrys payo¤ is increasing in its own protection and
decreasing in other industriesprotection, if w2( s) w2(0) > 0, this will automatically im-
ply that w1( s) w1(0) > 0. As a result, the status quo payo¤s of industries 1 and 2 will be
strictly higher than their payo¤s under free trade and thus the President cannot choose free
trade under FTA. In addition, industry 3 cannot be better o¤ than free trade and therefore
always prefers free trade. To analyze Case 3 in detail, we write equation (14) for industry 2,
w2(
s)  w2(0) =  s2  

3
X
l=i;j;k
 sl  
X
l=i;j;k
( sl )
2
2
. (15)
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In addition, we rewrite the Presidents welfare function given in equation (3) by using
equation (6) as
W = W (0) +
"

3
X
l=i;j;k
 l   1
2
X
l=i;j;k
 
 l +

3
2
 


3
2!#
.
Note that whenever w2( s)  w2(0)  0, the President can do unconstrained maximization
under FTA and choose free trade (since both industry 2 and industry 3 are better o¤ under
free trade compared to the status quo). On the other hand, if w2( s) w2(0) > 0, then under
FTA, the President needs to o¤er a tari¤ vector that makes the pivotal industry (industry 2)
indi¤erent with respect to the status quo. As a result, by using equation (15), we can state
the Presidents constraint as
w2(
P )  w2(0) > w2( s)  w2(0)
OR
P2  

3
X
l=i;j;k
Pl  
X
l=i;j;k
 
Pl
2
2
> w2( s)  w2(0),
where P = (P1 ; 
P
2 ; 
P
3 ) represents the tari¤ vector the President chooses under FTA. The
maximization problem the President faces is then given by
max
P
W (0) +
"

3
P
l=i;j;k
Pl   12
P
l=i;j;k
 
Pl +

3
2     
3
2#
+ 
"
P2   3
P
l=i;j;k
Pl  
P
l=i;j;k
(Pl )
2
2
  (w2( s)  w2(0))
#
.
It is easy to show that when w2( s)   w2(0) < 0, the constraint is not binding (so
 = 0) and P = (0; 0; 0), i.e., free trade. On the other hand, when w2( s)   w2(0) > 0,
the constraint binds (so  > 0). Then, rst order conditions imply that P1 = P3 =   
P
2
2
.
Putting these back into the constraint gives us
P1 = 
P
3 =  13

  
q
2   3 (w2( s)  w2(0))

< 0
P2 =
2
3

  
q
2   3 (w2( s)  w2(0))

> 0.
(16)
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Notice that when w2( s) w2(0) = 0, we still have P = (0; 0; 0), i.e., free trade. Hence, we
can conclude that whenever w2( s)   w2(0) > 0, the tari¤ vector the President chooses is
di¤erent than free trade, i.e., P 6= (0; 0; 0). On the other hand, when w2( s)  w2(0)  0,
the President always chooses free trade.
In addition to the above analysis, it is also possible to determine the boundary of the
region where free trade is chosen by the President under FTA, which is the same as the set
of status quo tari¤s such that w2( s) = w2(0). This condition yields
 s3 
q
2 + 12 s2   6 s1   9 ( s1)2   9 ( s2)2
3
  
3
. (17)
Equation (17) denes a surface in the three-dimensional space of tari¤ vectors, for  s2 2
(  
3
; 2
3
) and  s1 2 ( s2; 23 ). Any point on this surface is a point for which industry 2 is
indi¤erent between the status quo and free trade. If we begin on the surface and reduce  s1
or  s3 or increase 
s
2, industry 2 will now strictly prefer the status quo to free trade, and the
President will not propose free trade. If we perturb the tari¤vector in the opposite direction,
industry 2 will strictly prefer free trade, and free trade will be the equilibrium result.
We can see from equation (17) that d
s
3
ds2
> 0 and d
s
3
ds1
 0. In addition, we know that
 s3   s2   s1. Using these conditions in equation (17), under FTA we can determine the
region where the President chooses free trade and where she does not.
Case 3a:  s2 >
(1+
p
3)
6
or  s2 <
(1 
p
3)
6
; n1
N
= n2
N
= n3
N
= 1
3
; Q1 = Q2 = Q3 = 3
It is possible to show that, when  s2 >
(1+
p
3)
6
or  s2 <
(1 
p
3)
6
, industries 2 and 3 do
worse than free trade and hence once FTA is given to the President, she will choose free
trade and it will be approved by Congress with the support of industries 2 and 3.40 We need
to nd the bounds of  s2 that satisfy equation (17). This gives us the values of 
s
2 that make
industry 2s payo¤ equal under the status quo and free trade. Above that level, it is not
possible for industry 2 to do better than free trade (since that requires  s3 <   3 , which is not
40Given our assumption that  s1 >  s2 >  s3, under this case, industries 2 and 3 will do worse than free
trade for sure. On the other hand, industry 1 can do better or worse than free trade depending on the value
of  s1.
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possible by Assumption 1) thus free trade will result once FTA is granted to the President.
Since each industrys payo¤ is increasing in its own status quo tari¤ and decreasing in other
industries status quo tari¤s, we can nd the bounds of  s2 that satisfy equation (17) by
setting  s1 = 
s
2 and 
s
3 =   3 (its lower bound) and solving for  s2, which gives us
 s1 = 
s
2 =
 
1 +
p
3


6
and
 s1 = 
s
2 =
 
1 p3 
6
.
Given that  s1 >  s2, for any value of  s2 >
(1+
p
3)
6
or  s2 <
(1 
p
3)
6
, we will have w2( s) 
w2(0) < 0. Therefore, once FTA is given, free trade will be chosen by the President.
Case 3b: (
1 p3)
6
  s2  (
1+
p
3)
6
; n1
N
= n2
N
= n3
N
= 1
3
; Q1 = Q2 = Q3 = 3
In this case, for any value of  s2 such that
(1 
p
3)
6
  s2  (
1+
p
3)
6
, we can nd a critical
value of  s3, say 
s
3, that satises equation (17). Then, if 
s
3 < 
s
3, industries 1 and 2 do better
than free trade and under FTA, the President has to o¤er a tari¤ vector P 6= (0; 0; 0) given
in equation (16) that makes the pivotal industry (industry 2) indi¤erent to the status quo.
At the same time, this tari¤ vector makes industry 3 better o¤ whereas industry 1 worse o¤
compared to the status quo. On the other hand, if  s3 >  s3, industries 2 and 3 cannot do
better than free trade and under FTA, the President chooses free trade, P = (0; 0; 0).
So far, we have assumed that FTA is always given to the President. In this part, we show
it is indeed the case that granting FTA to the President is optimal for all industries. To do
so, we will compare each industrys payo¤ under FTA and under no FTA and show that the
payo¤s under FTA are strictly better than the payo¤s under no FTA.
Under FTA, since the President has to keep industry 2 as well o¤ as it would be under
the status quo, the payo¤s industry 1 and industry 3 obtain are strictly decreasing in the
status quo payo¤ of industry 2. Given that w2 ( ) is decreasing in  1 and  3 and increasing
in  2, and given our ordering  s1 >  s2 >  s3, the vector of status quo tari¤s that maximize
w2 (
s) necessarily implies  s1 = 
s
2. Hence, using equation (15), the maximization problem
49
can be written as
max
 s
w2(
s) = w2(0) + 
s
2  

3
X
l=i;j;k
 sl  
X
l=i;j;k
( sl )
2
2
s.t.  s1 = 
s
2,
leads to the vector of status quo tari¤s
 s1 = 
s
2 =

6
,
 s3 =  

3
.
The value of w2( s) evaluated at these tari¤s is,
w2(
s) = w2(0) +
2
12
. (18)
Given  s1 >  s2 >  s3, this is the highest payo¤ industry 2 can obtain under the status quo.
By equation (16), when  s =
 

6
; 
6
;  
3

, the President chooses
P1 = 
P
3 =  
1
3
0@  
s
32
4
1A ,
P2 =
2
3
0@  
s
32
4
1A .
Plugging these back into equation (6), we have
w3 = w3(0)  
3
0@  
s
32
4
1A  1
2
0@0@   2
3
s
32
4
1A2 + 2
9

32
4

  
2
3
1A
= w3(0)  
2
3
+

3
s
32
4
  1
2
0@2   4
3
s
32
4
+
2
9

32
4
1A
= w3(0)  2
 
11
12
 
r
3
4
!
.
Since P1 = 
P
3 , we have w1 = w3 under FTA. Notice that this is the lowest payo¤ industries 1
and 3 can get. If we compare this payo¤with the one under the bargaining subgame given in
equation (10), we can see that it is larger since the second term in the last line, 2

11
12
 
q
3
4

,
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is less than 
2
9
. Moreover, we know that industry 2s payo¤ under FTA is bounded below by
what it obtains under free trade, thus industry 2 does always better under FTA relative to
the bargaining subgame. As a result, all three industries obtain strictly higher payo¤s under
FTA than what they would obtain in the bargaining subgame, and therefore FTA is granted
in the rst stage to the President.
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Figure 1. Timing of the Trade Policy Formation Game 
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Figure 2. Asymmetric Industry Outputs
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Figure 3. Asymmetric Status quo Tariffs
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